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Abstract
Nowadays, the chaotic cryptosystems are gaining more attention due to their efficiency,
the assurance of robustness and high sensitivity corresponding to initial conditions. In
literature, on one hand there are many encryption algorithms that only guarantee security
while on the other hand there are schemes based on chaotic systems that only promise
the uncertainty. Due to these limitations, each of these approaches cannot adequately
encounter the challenges of current scenario. Here we take a unified approach and propose
an image encryption algorithm based on Lorenz chaotic system and primitive irreducible
polynomial S-boxes. First, we propose 16 different S-boxes based on projective general
linear group and 16 primitive irreducible polynomials of Galois field of order 256, and
then utilize these S-boxes with combination of chaotic map in image encryption scheme.
Three chaotic sequences can be produced by the Lorenz chaotic system corresponding to
variables x, y and z. We construct a new pseudo random chaotic sequence ki based on x, y
and z. The plain image is encrypted by the use of chaotic sequence ki and XOR operation
to get a ciphered image. To demonstrate the strength of presented image encryption, some
renowned analyses as well as MATLAB simulations are performed.
Keywords: Lorenz System, Chaos, Substitution box, image encryption, cryptanalysis.
1 Introduction
Last decade is considered as a remarkable era for secure communication and image processing.
In wireless communication, protection of digital data like text, sound, image and video
has increased importance because multimedia elements have taken hold on many important
fields like electronic commerce, banking industry, law enforcement agencies requirements
and personal data. The performance of old cryptosystems for image encryption is poor in
encryption of bulk sized data [1, 2]. To tackle this problem, new schemes based on chaos
for image encryption have been developed. In [3, 4], Amigo et. al., and Jakimoski, have
shown a link between secure communication and chaos theory. They said chaotic maps could
achieve some basic requirements of secure communication like randomness, robustness and
sensitivity to initial conditions. In [5,6], Ott and Alvarez have observed that values breaded by
chaotic maps can be regained based on initial conditions but extremely erratic, and this kind of
behavior is valuable for cryptosystems. Based on these properties, some cryptographers have
proposed novel cryptosystems in [7, 8]. Pseudorandom number generator based on chaotic
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maps is one of the emerging field nowadays and can be utilized in different cryptosystems to
get more security [9, 10].
Substitution box (S-box) is a fundamental component in symmetric key algorithms which
implement substitution. Substitution boxes are building blocks of symmetric cryptosystems.
The substitution tables (S-boxes) play a crucial part in the encryption algorithms in order to
meet the definition of a perfect security. Sometime big structures like S-box slowdown the
processing of the encryption in a scenario where big data processing is required, the main
reason is the complexity of that system and this kind of negative effect reduce the utility of
that encryption algorithm in practical communication. In literature, there are many chaotic
schemes that are using one or multiple (S-boxes) to get more security. There is no doubt that
when one will use S-box, the confusion creating ability of that algorithm between ciphertext
and secret key will improve but it will definitely reduce the encryption speed [11–29]. Here,
we propose an image encryption algorithm that builds on chaotic maps and S-boxes. First, we
propose novel 16 different S-boxes based on 16 different primitive irreducible polynomials of
Galois field of order 256 and projective general linear group, then the proposed S-boxes are
utilized in image encryption. The focus is to construct an efficient and secure image encryption
scheme building on straightforward and less complex steps, employing chaotic Lorenz system.
Some basic definitions of mathematical background for cryptography and details of chaotic
map are given in Section 2. The detailed description of image encryption algorithm proposed
in this work is given in Section 3. Section 4 depicts the outcomes of simulation and different
analyses. The conclusion of whole scheme is given in Section 5.
2 Basic Definitions
The structural units of designed image encryption technique are briefly discussed in this
section. First, an introduction to the Galois field and its primitive irreducible polynomials
is presented which is followed by the basics of Projective General Linear Group. Next, the
comprehensive description of chaotic Lorenz map is given.
2.1 Galois field and its primitive irreducible polynomials
It is known from the theory of Galois field that if p is a non-zero element of a Principle Ideal
Domain (PID) R, then Rp will be a field if p is irreducible. Therefore, for a prime p and q = p
n,
the finite field of order q can be given as GF(q) = GF(pn). The polynomial extension R[x]
of intergral domanin R is also intergral domain, therefore, in case of polynomial extension
R[x]/〈p(x)〉 will be a field structure when p(x) is primitive irreducible polynomial, where
〈p(x)〉 is a maximal ideal.
GF(q) =
GF(p)[x]
〈m(x)〉(2.1)
with m(x) denoting a monic primitive irreducible polynomial of degree n in Galois field
GF(pn). An example of above formula is as follows:
GF(28) =
GF(2)[x]〈
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x4+ x2+1
〉(2.2)
2
GF(28) =
{
a1+a2x+a3x2+a4x3+a5x4+a6x5+a7x6+a8x7+ 〈m(x)〉 |ai ∈GF(2)
}
The elements of GF(28) can be represented by a polynomial of degree 8 and 〈m(x)〉 is the
maximal ideal generated by monic irreducible polynomial, when the degree of polynomial
will exceed from 7 this maximal ideal will absorb it. Now, the question is how many different
irreducible polynomials are there corresponding to any Galosi field GF(pn). The formula to
find all irreducible polynomials is as follows:
1
n
d/n
∑ µ(d)Pn/d(2.3)
By using above formula, it can be seen in Table 1, that there are 30 irreducible polynomials for
GF(28). But for the construction of Galosi field which can generate its non-zero elements we
need primitive irreducible polynomials. In Table 1, we have shown that out of 30 irreducible
polynomials 16 are primitive irreducible. We have used Rabin’s test to find 30 irreducible
polynomials, Rabin’s test is as follows:
Theorem 2.1. Let p1, p2, ..., pk be all the prime divisors of n, and denoted ni = n/pi, for 1≤
i≤ k. A polynomial f ∈ Fq[x] of degree n is irreducible in Fq[x]⇔ gcd( f ,xqni − xmod f ) = 1
for 1≤ i≤ k, and f divides xqn− x.
A polynomial that generates all elements of an extension field from a base field is called
a primitive polynomial. It is worth noting that the primitive polynomials are irreducible
polynomials as well. There exists a primitive polynomial of degree n over GF(q) for any
prime or prime power q and any positive integer n. There are
aq(n) =
φ(qn−1)
n
(2.4)
primitive polynomials over GF(q), where φ(n) is the totient function.
Theorem 2.2. A polynomial of degree n over the finite field GF(2) is primitive if it has
polynomial order 2n−1.
Theorem 2.1,yields 30 irreducible polynomial of Table 1. The next question is how to get
16 primitive irreducible polynomials from these 30 irreducible polynomials. The procedure is
explained through an example of GF(24).
GF(24) =
GF(2)[x]
〈x4+ x3+1〉(2.5)
There are two primitive irreducible polynomials for GF(24). The process to check whether
an irreducible polynomial is primitive irreducible or not is shown in the example and counter
example below.
Suppose f (x) = x4+x3+1 is an irreducible polynomial. Let α be the root of f (x). If α is
the root of f (x) then we have
f (α) = α4+α3+1 = 0(2.6)
α4 = α3+1(2.7)
3
8 degree polynomials of GF(28) Irreducible Prim. irreducible
x8+ x7+ x5+ x4+1 Yes No
x8+ x4+ x3+ x2+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x5+ x3+ x1+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x6+ x4+ x3+ x2+1 Yes No
x8+ x6+ x5+ x4+ x2+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x4+ x3+1 Yes No
x8+ x5+ x3+ x2+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x6+ x4+ x3+ x2+ x1+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x4+ x3+ x+1 Yes No
x8+ x7+ x6+ x1+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x6+ x5+ x2+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x6+ x5+ x4+ x3+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x7+ x2+ x1+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x5+ x4+ x3+ x2+1 Yes No
x8+ x7+ x3+ x2+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x4+ x2+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x5+ x4+ x3+ x2+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x2+ x1+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x6+ x4+ x2+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x6+ x3+ x2+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x4+ x3+ x2+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x7+ x6+ x3+ x2+ x1+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x4+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x6+ x5+ x1+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x5+ x4+ x3+1 Yes No
x8+ x6+ x5+ x3+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x5+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x6+ x5+ x4+1 Yes Yes
x8+ x7+ x3+ x1+1 Yes No
x8+ x7+ x5+ x3+1 Yes Yes
Table 1: Irreducible and primitive irreducible polynomials corresponding to GF(28).
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Because the coefficients of polynomial are in GF(2), that is why −1 =+1.
α5 = α4+α = α3+1+α = α3+α+1(2.8)
α6 = α4+α2+α = α3+1+α2+α = α3+α2+α+1(2.9)
α7 = α4+α3+α2+α = α3+1+α3+α2+α = α2+α+1(2.10)
Where 2α3 = 0 due to GF(2).
α8 = α3+α2+α(2.11)
α9 = α4+α3+α2 = α3+1+α3+α2 = α2+1(2.12)
α10 = α3+α(2.13)
α11 = α4+α2 = α3+1+α2 = α3+α2+1(2.14)
α12 = α4+α3+α = α3+1+α3+α = α+1(2.15)
α13 = α2+α(2.16)
α14 = α3+α2(2.17)
α15 = α4+α3 = α3+1+α3 = 1(2.18)
It can be seen in above example that we are getting α15 = 1, and the order of GF(24) is 16.
This means f (x) = x4+ x3+1 is a primitive polynomial because it is generating all non-zero
elements of GF(24). Here α , the root of primitive polynomial, is known as primitive element.
In other words, because GF is also a cyclic group so α is the generator. All irreducible
polynomials are not primitive, to show this fact a counter example is given below.
Suppose f ′(x) = x4+ x2+1 is an irreducible polynomial. Let β be the root of f (x). If β
is the root of f ′(x) then we have
f ′(β ) = β 4+β 2+1 = 0(2.19)
β 4 = β 2+1(2.20)
Because the coefficients of polynomial are in GF(2), that is why −1 =+1.
β 5 = β 3+β(2.21)
β 6 = β 4+β 2 = β 2+1+β 2 = 2β 2+1 = 1(2.22)
It can be seen that f ′(x) = x4 + x2 + 1 is irreducible but not primitive, because it is not
generating all non-zero elements of GF(24). Similarly, in Table 1, we obtain all primitive
irreducible polynomials form irreducible polynomials.
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2.2 Projective General Linear Group (PGL)
The Projective General Linear Group (PGL) defined as the group acting on
−
F=GF(pn)
⋃{∞}
is the group of all transformations and is denoted by PGL(2,GF(pn)) . With the standard
understanding about ∞, PGL(2,GF(pn)) is the set of all linear fractional transformations
(LFT) of
−
F= GF(pn)
⋃{∞},
(2.23) PGL(2,GF(pn)) =
{
g :
−
F−→−F |g(z) = az+b
cz+d
,a,b,c,d ∈GF(pn), ad−bc 6= 0
}
Linear fractional transformation g(z) is shortly denoted by LFT. We study a special class of
maps
f : PGL(2,GF(28))×GF(28)−→GF(28)(2.24)
A LFT of PGL(2,GF(28))×GF(28) is a map of the form g(z) = az+bcz+d , a,b,c,d ∈ GF(28)
with ad−bc 6= 0
This transformation is depending on the invertible 2×2 matrix
(
a b
c d
)
2.3 Chaotic Lorenz System
The idea of defining the chaotic dynamics with the help of chaotic maps is a big breakthrough in
the field of dynamical systems. The mathematical modelling related to atmospheric convection
was presented by E. Lorenz [13, 14] through the system of chaotic differential equation given
by
dx
dt
= a(y− x)(2.25)
dy
dt
= bx− y− xz(2.26)
dz
dt
= xy− cz(2.27)
with the variables x,y and z in the intervals −60≤ x≤ 60, −60≤ y≤ 60, −60≤ z≤ 60. For
chaotic behavior, the values for parameters a,b, and c respectively are a = 10, b = 28 and
c = 8/3.
3 Primitive irreducible polynomial S-boxes
Now from the above linear transforamtion, we have;
fi : PGL
(
2,GF(28) =
GF(2)[x]
〈pi(x)〉
)
×
(
GF(28) =
GF(2)[x]
〈pi(x)〉
)
−→
(
GF(28) =
GF(2)[x]
〈pi(x)〉
)
where pi(x), i = 1,2,3, ...,16 are set of primitive irreducible polynomials of Table 1 for
GF(28). Therefore, we have 16 different fi, where i = 1,2,3, ...16 to construct 16 different
S-boxes with fixed a,b,c,d ∈ GF(28). The order of PGL(2,GF(28)) is 16776960, therefore
one can construct huge number of S-boxes by changing a,b,c,d ∈GF(28). In this section, we
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have given an example of creating one S-box using a= 32,b= 22,c= 11,d = 8∈GF(28) and
p1(x)= x8+x4+x3+x2+1. In polynomial form, a= x5,b= x4+x2+x,c= x3+x+1,d = x3.
Here it must be noted that the sign + indicates XOR operation.
f1(z) =
(x5)(z)+(x4+ x2+ x)
(x3+ x+1)(z)+(x3)
.(3.28)
For z = 0
f1(0) =
(x5)(0)+(x4+ x2+ x)
(x3+ x+1)(0)+(x3)
=
x4+ x2+ x
x3
=
µ239
µ3
= µ239−3−1 = µ237 = 237
where µ239 = µ4+µ2+µ , µ3 = x3 based on p1(x) = x8+ x4+ x3+ x2+1. It is to be noted
that corresponding to different primitive polynomials pi(x) of GF(28) these values of µ power
will be different.
For z = 1
f1(1) =
(x5)(1)+(x4+ x2+ x)
(x3+ x+1)(1)+(x3)
=
x5+ x4+ x2+ x
2x3+ x+1
=
x5+ x4+ x2+ x
x+1
=
µ249
µ25
= µ249−25−1 = µ225 = 225
where µ249 = µ5+µ4+µ2+µ , µ25 = µ+1 based on p1(x) = x8+ x4+ x3+ x2+1
For z = 2
f1(2) =
(x5)(2)+(x4+ x2+ x)
(x3+ x+1)(2)+(x3)
=
(x5)(x)+(x4+ x2+ x)
(x3+ x+1)(x)+(x3)
=
x6+ x4+ x2+ x
x4+ x3+ x2+ x
=
x5+ x4+ x2+ x
x+1
=
µ219
µ76
= µ219−76−1 = µ144 = 144(3.29)
where µ219 = µ6+µ4+µ2+µ , µ76 = µ4+µ3+µ2+µ based on p1(x) = x8+x4+x3+
x2 + 1. Similarly, for z = 3,4,5, ...,255 all the elements can be constructed corresponding
to primitive irreducible polynomial p1(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1. Table 2 displays all the
elements of p1(x) S-box.
3.1 Analysis for assessing the S-box strength
The analysis section focuses on determining the cryptographic strength of the designed S-box
through appropriate standard checks. The strength analysis of the designed S-boxes is carried
out by employing the commonly used standard criteria constituting bijectivity, nonlinearity,
bit independence criterion (BIC), strict avalanche criterion (SAC), differential approximation
probability (DP), and linear approximation probability (LP). The reader is referred to [30] for
definitions and important characteristics of these criteria. Table 3 presents the outcome of the
strength analsyes for our proposed S-boxes with different Primitive polynomial of GF(28).
4 Proposed algorithm for image encryption cryptosystem
For encryption of the digital material, a pseudorandom sequence generator needs to be
developed for transforming the real outputs of chaotic Lorenz system into a digital sequence.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 237 225 144 236 211 25 147 20 185 127 132 195 123 136 197 170
1 109 112 61 84 183 4 186 54 234 121 177 129 215 48 41 1
2 162 228 194 150 141 175 74 91 70 50 47 85 176 40 34 102
3 119 223 202 206 7 22 98 158 190 148 69 30 38 113 179 224
4 131 104 165 178 106 169 174 116 26 154 21 90 65 157 76 64
5 45 5 253 86 172 124 180 67 247 115 42 118 217 240 189 192
6 199 12 6 125 216 254 251 231 210 227 126 160 151 107 73 139
7 77 122 188 8 16 232 153 111 143 203 24 39 95 99 78 182
8 89 213 241 171 81 9 72 13 105 205 3 59 120 245 35 168
9 137 27 66 97 79 71 55 226 201 187 214 239 80 2 208 255
10 63 156 249 135 83 248 110 140 29 163 155 219 184 49 68 173
11 200 10 149 51 23 57 157 14 94 58 15 209 18 103 193 142
12 133 11 56 181 242 43 96 196 33 229 37 220 130 60 88 212
13 46 93 44 221 62 87 114 100 75 246 230 222 204 235 19 164
14 128 233 252 117 82 146 138 17 161 191 53 218 166 52 145 23
15 159 108 198 28 92 31 243 207 32 134 244 0 250 152 36 101
Table 2: The Proposed S-box
This step is summarized below. The Chaotic Lorenz system considered in this work can
generate three real sequences which we denote as x, y, and z. For the purpose of enhanced
randomness, we separate the first 100 values of the real sequences and denote the three real
sequences as {xi} ,{yi} ,{zi}, where i = 1,2,3, ...,m× n, where m× n is the size of plain
image. The tth value of the sequences of x, y, and z are defined as xt , yt and zt . We incorporate
a disturbing procession in order to evade the appearance of the periodic absolutely. This is
done by altering the value of x and y with an interval of 10000:
{
xt = xt + 0.1, yt = yt − 0.2, i f zt ≤ 0, t ≡ 1 mod (10000),
xt = xt + 0.2, yt = yt − 0.1, i f zt > 0, t ≡ 1 mod (10000).
(4.30)
At first, the integral part of the real sequences for all of x, y and z is discarded:

xi = xi− f loor(xi),
yi = yi− f loor(yi), i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m × n,
zi = zi− f loor(zi).
(4.31)
where f loor(x) means the maximum integer which is smaller than x. Next, a new chaotic
sequence is developed as follows:
ki = xi,yi,zi,xi+1,yi+1,zi+1, ...,xi+ f loor(m×n3 ),yi+ f loor(m×n3 ),zi+ f loor(m×n3 )(4.32)
At last, we get the modified chaotic sequence ki. The beauty of proposed chaotic sequence is
that it has the flavor of three xi,yi and zi chaotic sequences of chaotic Lorenz system. During
experiment we have changed the length of ki according to the size of plain image m×n by
discarding some of its values from the end.
In order to get an improved image encryption scheme, we have changed the position of
plaintext image pixels by randomness of ki. The proposed scheme is a two phases scheme.
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Pri. poly of GF(28) N.L BIC BIC of SAC SAC LP DP
x8+ x4+ x3+ x2+1 104.75 105.071 0.500 0.493 160/ 0.125 0.125
x8+ x5+ x3+ x1+1 105.75 104.929 0.502 0.503 158/ 0.140 0.242
x8+ x5+ x3+ x2+1 104.75 101.14 0.502 0.497 168/ 0.156 0.5
x8+ x6+ x4+ x3+ x2+ x1+1 105.75 105.35 0.502 0.502 160/0.125 0.125
x8+ x7+ x6+ x1+1 104.5 104.14 0.498 0.498 164/0.148 0.25
x8+ x6+ x5+ x2+1 105.5 105.71 0.502 0.505 160/0.125 0.125
x8+ x7+ x2+ x1+1 106.75 104.85 0.503 0.502 160/0.125 0.125
x8+ x7+ x3+ x2+1 104.25 104.42 0.501 0.512 162/0.132 0.25
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x4+ x2+1 106.5 105 0.504 0.496 162/0.132 0.117
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x2+ x1+1 106.25 103.71 0.500 0.498 162/0.132 0.125
x8+ x6+ x3+ x2+1 106 105.71 0.501 0.499 158/ 0.125 0.125
x8+ x7+ x6+ x5+ x2+ x1+1 106 103.57 0.502 0.497 166/0.156 0.25
x8+ x6+ x5+ x1+1 106.5 105.5 0.502 0.510 162/ 0.132 0.125
x8+ x6+ x5+ x3+1 106.25 105.37 0.504 0.507 158/0.132 0.125
x8+ x6+ x5+ x4+1 107.25 106.07 0.5 0.496 158/0.125 0.117
x8+ x7+ x5+ x3+1 106 105.35 0.503 0.516 162/0.132 0.125
Table 3: Analysis of proposed S-boxes with different Primitive polynomial of GF(28).
The first phase starts from equation 4.30 and ends at equation 4.34. The basic purpose of first
phase is to change the pixel positions of image. The second phase consists of equation 4.35,
4.36 and 4.37 and in this process we are attaining pixel value change based on XOR operation
to get a fully encrypted image. Let us assume that the plain image is I with m rows and n
columns. For the sake of convinience, we have changed the image I to a one dimensional
vector, say I1(1 :m×n).
I1((p−1)n+q) = I(p,q)(4.33)
where p = 1,2,3, ...,m and q = 1,2,3, ...,n. Now, the chaotic sequence ki, will change the
vector I1 to I2 with the help of following procedure.
I2(i) = I1(ki)(4.34)
where i = 1,2,3, ...,m×n. Define a new sequence with elements from GF(28) based on ki as
follows.
l(i) = mod(round((ki×104)),256)(4.35)
After getting l(i) sequence of random decimal numbers from GF(28), we will XOR l(i) with
I2(i) to get the final vector I3(i). Reshape I5(i) in the form of m×n matrix to get the first level
ciphered image as shown in equation 4.37.
I3(i) = I2(i)⊕ l(i)(4.36)
C.I = reshape(I3(i),m,n).(4.37)
As a last step for the proposed algorithm, we have applied the substitution step. We can
define the process of substitution in following steps:
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1. Consider the pixelof the image in the form of binary byte i.e., 8 binary bits. We divide
this set into four LSBs (Least significant bits) and Most significant bits (MSBs).
2. In the next step, the MSBs and LSBs having 4 bits each are converted into decimal
values. Conventionally, the pixel value which has to be replaced by S-box value is
selected with the help of decimal value of LSBs and MSBs. The S-box column is
selected by the decimal value of LSBs whereas the row of S-box is carefully chosen by
decimal value of MSBs.
3. One by one all the pixel values are substituted with the values of S-box.
4. In this case, as there are number of S-boxes so each pixel of the image is replaced by
single S-box, second pixel value is replaced by another S-box and this procedure will
continue till last pixel value.
5. For the selection of S-box out of 256 S-boxes with whom the original value will be
replaced is done with the help of x, y, z trajectories of Lorenz map.
5 Simulation results and statistical analysis
For simulation results, we take an image of cameraman having size 256×256×3. Table 4
represents the initial values of the chaotic maps which are used as secret keys. The plain image
and histogram of cameraman are depicted in Fig. 1a and Fig. 1c. Fig.1a undergoes the process
of encryption through our proposed encryption scheme. Fig. 1b gives the encrypted image.
The quality of encryption algorithm is exhibited in the strong visual results of encrypted
image. Furthermore, the histogram of encrypted image in Fig.1d also confirms the strength
of our scheme. The proposed image encryption scheme is also applied on gray scale image
having gray value of 124. The gray scale image is given in Fig. 2a. Fig. 2b represents the
encrypted image of the gray scale image. Moreover, Fig. 2c and Fig. 2d depict respectively
the histogram images of plaintext image and encrypted image. The encryption results are
satisfactory regardless that the plain image is high in autocorrelation. Furthermore, the
histogram of the encrypted gray scale image show strength of our proposed technique.
Parameters a b c
10 28 83
Table 4: The initial conditions for the chaotic maps utilized as the secret keys in proposed
encryption technique.
5.1 Statistical analysis
The purpose of statistical analysis is for assessing the robustness of our designed image
encryption technique. We employ distinct statistical analyses to determine the standard of
our proposed image encryption technique. In addition to this, the outcomes of our proposed
technique are compared with the corresponding results of well-known image encryption
methods. The description of these analyses is given in the following subsections.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1: Simulation outcomes of proposed scheme (a) 256×256 size plain image of cam-
eraman (b) cameraman image after encryption with secret keys (c) histogram analysis of
cameraman (d) histogram analysis of encrypted cameraman.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Simulation outcomes of new image encryption technique. (a) gray scale image
having 256×256 size, (b) encrypted image (c) histogram results of one gray scale image (d)
histogram results of encrypted one gray scale image.
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Figure 3: The distribution of horizontally adjacent pixels of (a) cameraman image and
(b) encrypted cameraman image. The distribution of vertically adjacent pixels of ciphered
cameraman image will have same behavior as pixels that are horizontal adjacent .
5.1.1 Correlation
Given an image with ρ(i, j) representing the pixel value at (i, j) position of the image. The
correlation of image is defined by [31] :
(5.38) Corr.=∑
i, j
(i−µi)( j−µ j)ρ(i, j)
ϕiϕ j
.
where the standard deviation is denoted by ϕ and µ is the variance. The value of correlation
provides a measure of similarity between the two neighboring pixels over the entire image. Its
values span is in [−1 1] where 1 represents perfect correlation.
The distribution of horizontally adjacent pixels of cameraman image is shown in Fig. 3a.
Fig. 3b displays the distribution for those pixels of encrypted cameraman image which are
horizontally adjacent. The distribution of vertical adjacent pixels in ciphered cameraman
image will act similar as they respond in horizontal adjacent pixels.
5.1.2 Entropy
Given an image with ρ(i, j) representing the pixel value at (i, j) position of the image. The
entropy of image is defined by [31]:
(5.39) Entropy =−∑
i, j
pr(ρ(i, j)) log2 pr(ρ(i, j)).
where pr(ρ(i, j)) denotes the probability of image pixel. For an image having 256 gray
scales, the entropy values are distributed in [0 8] and determine the randomness of image.
Bigger values of entropy imply bigger measure of randomness.
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5.1.3 Contrast
Given an image with ρ(i, j) representing the pixel value at (i, j) position of the image. The
contrast of image is defined by [31]:
(5.40) Contrast =∑
i, j
|i− j|2ρ(i, j).
The contrast values have the range [0 (size(Image)− 1)2]. In case of a constant image,
the contrast value is 0. Bigger values of contrast imply more variation in image pixels. The
image contrast analysis makes it possible for the observer to clearly recognize the objects in
the image texture.
5.1.4 Homogeneity
In [31], the homogeneity of image is defined by:
(5.41) Homo.=∑
i, j
ρ(i, j)
1+ |i− j| .
where the location of image pixels is given by i, j . In this analysis, the closeness of gray
level cooccurrence matric (GLCM) diagonal and GLCM is calculated. The homogeneity
values lie in the interval [0 1].
5.1.5 Energy
The energy of an image can be defined by
(5.42) Energy =∑
i, j
ρ(i, j)2.
where i, j depicts the position of image pixels. The above equation interprets the energy as the
summation of the square of all elements of GLCM. The energy values lies in the interval [0 1]
and the constant image has maximum energy value of 1.
Table 5 shows the values of statistical analyses and also the comparison with other existing
techniques. This comparison indicates the quality of our proposed scheme.
Analysis Corr. Entropy Homo. Contrast Energy
Ref. [32] -0.0308 7.9311 0.8365 8.0522 0.1984
Ref. [33] 0.0439 2.5643 0.5733 4.9454 0.4263
Ref. [34] -0.0293 7.9801 0.9102 8.6603 0.0674
Ref. [35] 0.0313 7.9735 0.8251 8.1833 0.2132
Ref. [36] 0.0687 7.1735 0.8121 8.3849 0.1254
Proposed -3e-4 7.9521 0.9598 8.4587 0.3521
Table 5: Comparison of the statistical analyses of the encrypted images of Lena obtained
through application of proposed image encryption algorithm and other relevant techniques.
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6 Security analysis
It is mandatory to compute the security analyses to assess the strength of any cryptosystem.
Here, we assess the security of our scheme with the help of certain security analyses like
key space, key sensitivity, avalanche analysis, noise resistant analysis and cryptanalysis. The
comparison of the outcomes of these analyses with the security analyses of other schemes
exemplify the strength of our proposed technique. Following sections describe the security
analyses in detail.
6.1 Key space and key sensitivity
For any cryptographic system, the total count of secret keys which are utilized to encrypt the
data are named as key space and it has its importance as far as security of whole scheme is
concerned. In this work, the initial conditions of three different chaotic maps are the secret
keys. The secret key has average range of 1020 and we have used three different secret keys so
the total count of different keys is given as 1020×3 = 1060. A recent personal computer will
require over 1010 years to go through all possible blends of this huge keyspace.
One of the features of the quality cryptosystem is its sensitivity to a tiny change in secret
keys. For instance, the change in secret key during decoding process will give altogether a
different decoded image. This mechanism is named as key sensitivity. Our designed encryp-
tion technique is sensitive even to a minor variation in the initial conditions. To prove this
claim, we will change the secret keys and show the pictorial results. By using secret keys
given in Table 4, we have encrypted the cameraman image as given in Fig. 1b. Considering
four different cases of changing initial secret keys we have following results.
Case I: If the initial secret key k1 is slightly changed i.e., k1 = a= 10 to k
′
1 = a= 10.0000000001
then it is observed that the decryption process does not get the required results. Fig. 4a depicts
the decryption of plain-image with key k
′
1. In this process, the remaining two keys were
remained the same.
Case II: For the second case, the key k2 is changed from its original value i.e., k2 = b = 28 to
k
′
2 = b = 28.0000000001 and again with this slight change in one key, the decryption image
does not resemble to the original plaintext image and hence prove our claim of key sensitivity.
The decryption is given in Fig. 4b.
Case III: The initial secret key k3 is slightly changed while keeping the remaining keys same.
A change of 0.0000000001 in k3 i.e k3 = c = 83 to k
′
3 = c =
8
3 + 0.0000000001 provides a
different original image as given in Fig. 4c.
Case IV: For the last case, the key k4 is changed like k1 = a = 10 to k
′
1 = a = 9.99999999999
and the decrypted image is given in Fig. 4d.
For each of the four cases, even a slight variation in the initial secret key could not obtain the
original image and hence proving our claim of key sensitivity for proposed algorithm.
6.2 Avalanche analysis
In block ciphers, the effect of avalanche mentions one of the properties of strong cryptographic
algorithms. If a single input bit change effect the half number of output bits, then it is an
apparent avalanche effect. Researchers prefer unified average change intensity (UACI) and
number of pixel change rate (NPCR) to measure the effect of avalanche criteria. The detailed
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4: Key sensitivity analysis (a) First secret key is altered from k1 = a = 10 to k
′
1 = a =
10.0000000001 (b)Second secret key is k2 = b = 28 to k
′
2 = b = 28.0000000001 (c) Third
secret key is altered from k3 = c = 83 to k
′
3 = c =
8
3 +0.0000000001 (d) Fourth secret key is
altered from k1 = a = 10 to k
′
1 = a = 9.99999999999.
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description of this effect is provide in [37] as
(6.43) NPCR =
∑i, j D(i, j)
N×M ×100%,
(6.44) UACI =
1
N×M
[
∑
i, j
|C1(i, j)−C2(i, j)|
255
]
×100%,
where the two ciphered digital images C1 and C2 are attained by changing the single bit of plain
image. Moreover, the height and width of cipher images are given by N and M respectively.
We can define the D(i, j) as
D(i, j) =
{
0 if C1(i, j) =C2(i, j),
1 if C1(i, j) 6=C2(i, j).
By adjusting the single pixel of plaintext image, the rate of change of pixel quantity of
encrypted image is measured by number of pixel change rate (NPCR) analysis. Moreover,
the normal power of contrast between plain and encrypted images is calculated by unified
average change intensity analysis (UACI). The calculated minimum value for NPCR must be
50percent. In our work, three different plain images of Lena, baboon and cameraman have
been through NPCR and UACI analyses. For each image, the position of bit is firstly changed
around first pixel then around middle pixel and finally around the last pixel. Table 6 depicts the
outcomes of NPCR and UACI for all cases of three images. In this Table the value of NPCR
remains greater than 99 percent and value of UACI is greater than 33 percent. These results
indicate the strong avalanche effects. In addition to this, a comparison has been established
between avalanche values of proposed scheme and AES
Analysis UACI(%) NPCR(%)
Images & Loc. Prop. AES Prop. AES
Baboon
first 33.3620 33.4463 99.1252 99.6124
mid 33.4510 33.4561 99.5271 99.6033
last 33.6930 33.5252 99.6389 99.6185
Lena
first 33.2010 33.3996 99.2563 99.6094
mid 33.6320 33.3139 99.5210 99.6506
last 33.5202 33.5133 99.4198 99.6002
Cman
first 33.5120 33.5360 99.5212 99.6048
mid 33.3014 33.5212 99.5862 99.6201
last 33.4120 33.5245 99.5410 99.5819
Key S.
Case I 33.7401 33.5029 99.4802 99.5972
Case
II
33.2015 33.5468 99.0025 99.6460
Table 6: The comparison of UACI and NPCR analysis of our designed technique and AES
on images of Lena, Baboon and cameraman. Three cases are proposed for each image which
are changing of single bit in the first pixel, the mid pixel and the last pixel. Moreover, the key
sensitivity analysis for two cases is given.
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By using NPCR and UACI analyses, the key sensitivity of proposed scheme is also
evaluated. In first case, two same keys with difference of only 1 bit are used to calculate
the difference between two encrypted images. For the second case, the difference of one bit
between two keys would remain the same but we calculated the difference between encrypted
and decrypted images. Table 6 gives the results of both cases along with comparison with
AES. The results of Table show the required avalanche effect.
6.3 Noise resistant analysis
The noise resistant encryption algorithm depicts the strength of any cryptosystem. Any
transmitted data may get effected by channel (irrespective of wired or wireless channel) noise
or deliberately added noise. It is observed that it is hard to decipher the abandoned cipher image
even the portion of the image is affected. Few methods like error detection and correction
have been employed to counter these situations but at the cost of computational complexity.
For successful transmission and decryption of cipher data, the error detection and correction
are required before both the steps. So, ultimately it increases the complexity of the system. In
this proposed technique, the addition of noise does not become the hurdle to decipher image
correctly with some minor changes. To verify this claim, a series of experiments regarding
successful deciphering have been done with noise addition in the cipher images. Fig. 5a
and Fig 5b. represent the plain image and encrypted images respectively. This encryption is
done with the help of secret keys of Table 4. For noise resistance test, the 10,000 pixels of
encrypted image are either cropped or made corrupted with white pixels as illustrated in Fig.
5c. The deciphering of this image is given in Fig. 5d. Clearly, this pictorial representation
indicates the successful decryption with minor changes. To prove this claim for other images,
the cameraman image is encrypted with the secret keys of Table 4. The plain image with
noise and its encryption is given in Fig. 5e and Fig. 5f respectively. Now, again we removed
first 10, 000 pixels either with the help of cropping or by corrupting the image. Interestingly,
the decryption is successful with minor changes and is shown in Fig. 5h. On the other hand,
there is a difference between the deciphering of plain text and digital image. For noisy cipher
text, the deciphering of the text gives a whole new text. There are many examples in which
the major concern is to recognize the face of the person and object irrespective of quality of
decipher images. For this reason, the deciphering of encrypted images having added noise is
major breakthrough.
6.4 Cryptanalysis
To assess the strength of proposed scheme against different malicious attacks, following
attacks are considered to evaluate the proposed cryptosystem.
6.4.1 Linear cryptanalysis
Linear approximation probability is used to analyze the imbalance of an event. The maximal
amount of imbalance of the event can also be obtained with the help of this analysis. In this
analysis, two masks Γx and Γy, respectively are applied to parity of both input and output bits.
In [38] , it is defined as
(6.45) LP = maxΓxΓy6=0
∣∣∣∣{x/X •Γx = S(x)•Γy = ∆y}2n − 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
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(b)(a) (d)(c)
(f) (g)(e) (h)
(a)
Figure 5: (a) A test image, (b) encryption of test image using secret keys. (c) Adding noise in
the cipher image by changing first 10,000 pixels either by cropping or corrupting the file by
using the white pixels. (d) Deciphered image. (e) The cameraman noisy image, (f) encryption
of cameraman image using secret keys. (g) Adding noise in the cipher image by changing
first 10,000 pixels either by cropping or corrupting the file by using the white pixels. After
decryption, (h) Deciphered image.
where all the inputs values are contained by set X and total number of this set are 2n. As we
have used 8 different S-boxes and the average maximum value of LP is LPmax = 2−4.21 and
having distinct 256 S-boxes the maximum LP is given as LP4rmax = 2
−4.21×256 = 2−1077. By
seeing the outcomes of LP, it is almost impossible for an invader to differentiate our proposed
cipher with the help of random permutation and hence, the proposed algorithm will show
resistance for countering linear cryptanalysis.
6.4.2 Differential cryptanalysis
One of the precise goals for assurance of uniform mapping, the input differential extraordinarily
supervises the differential at output end. These features certify the probability of uniform
mapping for every input bit i. The main purpose of approximation probability is to calculate
differential uniformity of S-box. In [39] it is given as:
(6.46) DP(∆x→ ∆y) =
[{x ∈ X/S(x)⊕S(x⊕∆x) = ∆y}
2m
]
,
where the input and output differentials are given by ∆x and ∆y respectively. For S-boxes,
the maximum average value of DP is DPmax = 2−4.05. Here, the number of active S-boxes is
exactly 256 i.e., DP4rmax = 2
−4.05×256 = 2−1036. By seeing this outcome, it is confirmed that
proposed scheme has the ability to resist against malicious differential cryptanalysis.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, a combination of proposed S-boxes and chaotic maps is used for image encryption
algorithm. This scheme consists of two phases. In the first phase, substitution is performed
via multiple S-boxes instead of a single S-box. The application of several S-boxes not only
provides additional security but also utilizes less rounds of encryption. The initial values of
Lorenz chaotic map help to operate each round of encryption. In addition to this, permutation
is performed in the second phase. The resistance of proposed encryption scheme is depicted
through simulation and security analyses results. The outcomes of cryptanalysis also confirm
the robustness of our proposed scheme. This work also motivates researchers to add different
changes like increasing number of S-boxes and encryption rounds while keeping standard of
encryption and computational complexity.
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